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EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A 
SMART CONTRACT BLOCKCHAIN FRAMEWORK 
FOR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
RYAN CLEMENTS? 
ABSTRACT 
Despite wide speculation about its use-value, there are very 
few large-scale Blockchain implementations, particularly in sophis-
ticated financial applications and mature markets. The extent of 
Blockchain’s disruptive potential in these domains is uncertain. This 
Article considers Blockchain’s use-value for credit default swap con-
tract execution, fulfillment, and post-trade processing by using, as 
an assessment base, a series of derivative industry whitepapers, aca-
demic and technological evaluative studies, and commentary relat-
ing to current market undertakings. In summary, when applied to 
credit default swaps, there are many barriers to implementation, 
as well as costs, fragmentation risks, technological deficiencies, and 
practical drawbacks. As a result, there is some doubt on the extent 
of Blockchain’s short-term transformational value for complex finan-
cial structures and mature trading markets. This, at least in part, 
explains the fact that Blockchain projects are currently slow to ma-
terialize in derivatives and other financial market applications. 
                                                                                                                        
? Ryan Clements, BA (Honors, Alberta), LLB (First Class, Alberta), LLM 
(Magna Cum Laude, Duke) is an adjunct law professor at the University of Alberta 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bitcoin (“BTC”) took the world by storm in 2017.1 First, there 
was an unprecedented price surge;2 then, shortly thereafter, the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) validated 
BTC derivatives3—sparking another price spike (and a round of 
criticism for facilitating systemic risk).4 Although spot market sell-
offs in early 2018 led some to suggest the BTC bubble was “burst-
ing”5 (and confirmed the skepticism of others, including industry 
leaders,6 who questioned BTC’s viability as a payment substitute)7 
                                                                                                                        
1 Frances Coppola, Bitcoin’s Bubble Is Bursting. How Long Will Prices Fall?, 
FORBES (Mar. 20, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola 
/2018/03/20/bitcoins-bubble-is-bursting-how-low-will-prices-fall/#20a0c2ac724e 
[http://perma.cc/A5AD-88LS]. 
2 See Julie Verhage, Bitcoin’s Epic Rise Leaves Late-1990s Tech Bubble in 
the Dust, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2017-08-29/bitcoin-s-epic-rise-leaves-late-1990s-tech-bubble-in-the 
-dust [https://perma.cc/XY9S-XB3M]. 
3 LedgerX, LLC was first granted registration as a derivatives clearing or-
ganization for “fully-collateralized digital currency” swaps and options. See Press 
Release No. 7592-17, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., CFTC Grants 
DCO Registration to LedgerX LLC (July 24, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/Press 
Room/PressReleases/pr7592-17 [https://perma.cc/98LS-XYSY]. Then the CFTC 
allowed the self-certifications of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. and 
the CBOE Futures Exchange for BTC futures products as well as the Cantor 
Exchange for BTC “binary options.” See Press Release No. 7654-17, U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm., CFTC Statement on Self-certification of Bitcoin 
Products by CME, CFE, and Cantor Exchange (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.cftc 
.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7654-17 [https://perma.cc/94AZ-7P5U]. 
4 In response to this criticism, the CFTC scheduled a series of meetings to 
investigate the self-certification process and the risks inherent in the digital 
currency derivatives market. See Pete Schroeder & Michelle Price, U.S. De-
rivatives Regulator to Review Bitcoin Futures Risks, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2018, 
12:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cftc-bitcoin/u-s-derivatives 
-regulator-to-review-bitcoin-futures-risks-idUSKBN1ET20R [https://perma.cc 
/P66M-786H]. 
5 See Coppola, supra note 1. 
6 See Matthew Frankel, What 3 Billionaires Think About Bitcoin, MOTLEY 
FOOL (June 15, 2017), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/06/15/what-3-bil 
lionaires-think-about-bitcoin.aspx [https://perma.cc/2MMK-HMPN]. 
7 See David Henry & Anna Irrera, JP Morgan’s Dimon Says Bitcoin “is a 
fraud,” REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017, 9:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-usa-banks-conference-jpmorgan/jpmorgans-dimon-says-bitcoin-is-a-fraud-idU 
SKCN1BN2KP [https://perma.cc/JB9L-UYHT]. 
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many BTC skeptics also proclaimed Blockchain8—BTC’s underlying 
technology9—as the real future.10 
This sentiment seems almost ubiquitous at times.11 Despite 
the absence of large-scale, Blockchain implementations and what 
technology writer, Irving Wladawsky-Berger, asserts in a recent 
Wall Street Journal article called a Blockchain “killer-app,”12 no one 
knows the extent that Blockchain will ultimately impact commer-
cial transactions and financial markets.13 There is a lot of specula-
tion about its use value across multiple applications including data 
management,14 servicing assets,15 identity protection,16 and supply 
chain.17 There is even talk about Blockchain being valuable for 
                                                                                                                        
8 For simplicity, in this Article I refer to “Blockchain” as representative of 
the term “distributed ledger technology.” There are, strictly speaking, other 
forms of distributed ledger technology in addition to Blockchain. 
9 See Sean Williams, The Basics of Blockchain Technology, Explained in 
Plain English, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:09 AM), https://www.fool.com 
/investing/2018/01/10/the-basics-of-blockchain-technology-explained-in-p.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9VV9-ZWRW]. 
10 See Polina Marinova, Jamie Dimon: Bitcoin Bad, Blockchain Good, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/13/jamie-dimon-bitcoin 
-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/DW6P-3TYG]. 
11 See Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, In Blockchain We Trust, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610781/in-blockchain 
-we-trust/ [https://perma.cc/D6Z4-KF6Q]. 
12 See Irving Wladawsky-Berger, In Search of Blockchain’s Killer-Apps, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/03/09/is 
-search-of-blockchains-killer-apps/ [https://perma.cc/8VHL-MZHQ]. 
13 Id.  
14 See EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LED-
GERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 13 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter 
DTCC WHITEPAPER] (“DTCC’s viewpoint is that basic industry master data is 
an ideal candidate for improvement using decentralized consensus, rule stan-
dardization and auditable change history. This information is used by the entire 
industry by definition, and the lack of consistency and quality is a recurrent 
industry problem. Further, this could be constructed in such a manner that mul-
tiple firms can be authorized as data submitters, there can be many data 
validators and the majority of users will be data consumers.”). 
15 Id. at 13–14. 
16 The amount of cybersecurity data protection that a Blockchain provides 
varies with each Blockchain. See generally Adam Waks, Blockchain and Pri-
vacy, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.as 
px?g=82c7ceb8-621f-4f6f-881f-8eabcf4507a6 [https://perma.cc/LV9M-4EB3]. 
17 See Jacob Bunge, Latest Use for a Bitcoin Technology: Tracing Turkeys 
From Farm To Table, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/latest-use-for-a-bitcoin-technology-tracing-turkeys-from-farm-to 
-table-1508923801 [https://perma.cc/26LW-G34N]; see also Robert Hackett, 
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election fraud prevention18 and having important residual benefits 
for charities.19 The question of Blockchain’s application to com-
plex financial transactions in mature economic markets is yet to 
be proven,20 and it is in this forum where the Article seeks to con-
tribute. Specifically, the Article will consider Blockchain’s use value 
in over-the-counter (“OTC”) and centrally cleared credit default 
swaps (“CDS”)—the risk management tools popularly vilified for 
their part in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”).21 
The reason OTC CDSs have been chosen for this assessment 
is because they have been described by some, including technology 
writer, Noelle Acheson, as “ideal” for Blockchain implementation 
since they have a “programmable structure,” they operate in a post-
GFC regulatory “standardized” setting, and they trade largely “in 
a self-contained market.”22 What can be concluded, however, upon 
reviewing the mechanics of CDS contractual functionality, and the 
pros and cons of using Blockchain for CDS post-trade processing, is 
                                                                                                                        
Walmart and 9 Food Giants Team Up on IBM Blockchain Plans, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/walmart-blockchain-ibm-food-nestle 
-unilever-tyson-dole/ [https://perma.cc/X5S6-KHB2]. 
18 See Alyssa Satara, What Is Blockchain Used for Besides Bitcoin?, FORBES 
(Nov. 17, 2017, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/11/17/what-is 
-blockchain-used-for-besides-bitcoin/#3b4cdc7d446e [https://perma.cc/D44R-22F6]. 
19 See Rhodri Davies, Knowing Me, Knowing You: Self-Sovereign Digital 




20 See Amy Nordrum, Wall Street Firms to Move Trillions to Blockchains 
in 2018, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org 
/telecom/internet/wall-street-firms-to-move-trillions-to-blockchains-in-2018 
[https://perma.cc/S22H-ZJ5B]. 
21 The role that CDS played in the 2008 financial crisis has been widely 
cited, particularly in regards to American International Group, Inc.’s (“AIG”) 
CDS overexposure and subsequent government bailout. See Gina-Gail S. 
Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with 
Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 853–54 (2014); see also 
Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Miss-
ing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 30, 44–45, 60 (2011); 
William Spencer Topham, Re-regulating “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and 
Future Derivative Regulation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 135 (2010). 
22 Noelle Acheson, Blockchain and credit default swaps—Part 2, the appli-
cation, FINTECHBLUE (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.fintechblue.com/2017/09 
/blockchain-credit-default-swaps-part-2-application/ [https://perma.cc/68TJ-TR27]. 
374 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:369 
that at least in the short run, the costs largely outweigh the bene-
fits.23 Blockchain could be the future of financial transactions, but 
at the moment, when applied to CDS there are many barriers to 
integration.24 Perhaps, this should give us pause with respect to 
the technology itself 25 and the deficiencies it may introduce when 
rendering contracts to code.26 At the very least it should temper 
some of the “irrational exuberance”27 about Blockchain and just 
how disruptive it will ultimately be for complex financial trans-
actions and mature market structures.28 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Article relies on and 
applies the findings of numerous industry technological assess-
ment papers, academic studies, and market commentaries with 
a particular focus on a series of recent whitepapers29 published 
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)30 
                                                                                                                        
23 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14. 
24 See Acheson, supra note 22.  
25 See Kai Stinchcombe, Blockchain is not only crappy technology but a bad 
vision for the future, MEDIUM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/@kaistinch 
combe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hell 
hole-c1ca122efdec [https://perma.cc/LY9H-U2SP]. 
26 See Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain 5–6 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of 
Law Research Paper No. 2018-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782 
[https://perma.cc/7DBX-E4DA]. 
27 The term “irrational exuberance” was first used by Alan Greenspan to 
describe the dot.com boom and then later adopted by Nobel Prize winner 
Robert Shiller in his book of the same name. Shiller has also labeled Bitcoin as 
“irrational exuberance” and compared it to the Tulip craze of the seventeenth 
century. See Brad Tuttle, Bitcoin Is Likely To ‘Totally Collapse and Be Forgotten,’ 
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Says, MONEY (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com 
/money/5109474/bitcoin-predictions-collapse-economist-robert-shiller/ [https:// 
perma.cc/DD8W-MDKF]. 
28 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 18. 
29 See generally INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INFRASTRUCTURE, https:// 
www.isda.org/category/infrastructure/market-infrastructure-technology [https:// 
perma.cc/W3Q6-ALHT]; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, THE FUTURE OF DE-
RIVATIVES PROCESSING & MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE (Sept. 15, 2016), https:// 
www.isda.org/2016/09/15/the-future-of-derivatives-processing-and-market-infra 
structure/ [https://perma.cc/SP8T-FWU7] [hereinafter ISDA FUTURE PROCESSING]; 
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N LINKLATERS, WHITE PAPER: SMART CONTRACTS 
& DISTRIBUTED LEDGER—A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Aug. 2017), https://www.isda 
.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FZ5G-B862] [hereinafter ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER]. 
30 ISDA has been described as the “de facto trade association of the global 
OTC derivatives industry.” See Dan Awrey, Limits of Private Ordering Within 
Modern Financial Markets, 34 REV. FIN. & BANKING L. 184, 205 (2014); see 
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and by swap data repository Depository Trust & Clearing Corpo-
ration (DTCC).31 Also, several financial market participants have 
considered migrating operational infrastructure to the Blockchain 
and their justifications, and related commentary, will also be as-
sessed and applied.32 In light of these resources, the Article will pro-
ceed as follows: in Part I, after providing an overview of Blockchain, 
smart contracts, and transactional foundations for CDS (and intro-
ducing the ISDA Master Agreement (“MA”) structure), the Article 
will present a hypothetical smart contract CDS operational frame-
work, using ISDA recommendations from a 2017 joint whitepaper 
on smart contracts with global law firm Linklaters.33 The Section 
will further adapt the framework for operational technicalities 
based on current academic studies and industry assessments of 
Blockchain.34 This Section will also discuss recommendations from 
both ISDA35 and the DTCC36 on how Blockchain could use hybrid 
models (combining current infrastructure with Blockchain)37 and 
will conclude by highlighting the concerns that stand in the way 
of full integration.38 Part II will consider the costs and benefits 
of using “permissioned”39 Blockchain infrastructure for CDS 
operations, post-trade processing, and Dodd Frank Act (DFA) 
                                                                                                                        
also Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private 
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of 
Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L. L. 9, 13 (2013). ISDA was founded in 1985 
and now operates in sixty-eight countries with over 875 members. See INT’L 
SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, About ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda 
[https://perma.cc/7GS6-DPWX] (ISDA created “the ISDA Master Agreement and 
a wide range of related documentation materials, and in ensuring the enforcea-
bility of their netting and collateral provisions, has helped to significantly reduce 
credit and legal risk.”). 
31 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14. 
32 See Amy Nordrum, Wall Street Firms to Move Trillions to Blockchains in 
2018, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tele 
com/internet/wall-street-firms-to-move-trillions-to-blockchains-in-2018 [https:// 
perma.cc/S22H-ZJ5B]. 
33 See generally ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29. References to this 
whitepaper, throughout the body of the Article, will for simplicity, combine ISDA 
and Linklaters collectively by the descriptive term “ISDA.” 
34 See generally id. 
35 See id. at 13–15. 
36 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 13. 
37 See generally id.; ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29. 
38 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14; ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, 
supra note 29. 
39 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
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Title VII40 regulatory compliance, and will show that despite po-
tential cost savings and operational efficiencies, there are tech-
nological and practical barriers to widespread adoption, and the 
investment returns for near term implementation are uncertain.41 
The Article concludes by surveying recent derivatives (primarily 
focused on post-trade processing) and financial services market 
Blockchain implementations.42 
I. WHAT DOES A SMART CONTRACT-CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK LOOK LIKE? 
A. Blockchain Foundations: The Basics 
Blockchain facilitates a “distributed, decentralized, immu-
table ledger for verifying and recording transactions” and a means 
to “securely send, receive, and record value or information through a 
peer-to-peer network of computers.”43 Because it is decentralized, 
and transactions are “cryptographically signed”44 it purports to pro-
tect against cyber-attacks by “creating a public, cryptographically 
protected transaction list.”45 ISDA has also noted that Blockchain 
can be public (like Bitcoin) or “permissioned” (private) with the 
latter allowing for an “override” or “super-administrator” function.46 
Blockchain works to remove the role of “trust” in our financial 
transactions.47 As Edward Baker in a recent Southwestern Law 
Review article describes, we trust banks to hold our money, gov-
ernments to secure it, credit card companies and payment sys-
tems to “verify and authenticate transactions,” and the legal system 
                                                                                                                        
40 Title VII to the Dodd Frank Act instituted comprehensive regulation for 
OTC derivatives. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010). 
41 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 18. 
42 See generally id. 
43 Nicolette Kost De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain 
Revolution, Smart Contracts and Financial Transactions, 21 No. 5 CYBERSPACE 
LAWYER NL 3, 1 (2016). 
44 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 7. 
45 Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property Systems and Anarchy: How Trust-
less Property Technology Will Shape the Future of Property Exchange, 45 SW. 
L. REV. 351, 355 (2015). 
46 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 8; see also Nordrum, supra 
note 32. 
47 See Baker, supra note 45, at 352. 
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to protect our interests.48 Cryptography can add trust;49 however, 
criminals can also use cryptography against us.50 Since consumer 
distrust in financial institutions has increased post GFC, Block-
chain could also remove power and control away from the banks.51 
The “chain” in a Blockchain is simply a “chain of owner-
ship of a given piece of property,”52 each transaction being proved 
by cryptography53 in a process called “mining”54 (miners receive 
a small amount of some “virtual currency” for performing the 
cryptographic calculations).55 Once proven, the “time-stamped” 
transaction block is published on the distributed ledger.56 Each 
“node” (user) on the network gets a copy of the new information 
at the same time so there are not duplicative records.57 Thus, 
Blockchain eliminates the need for “centralized storage” and 
reduces “single point of failure” risks (like hacking or technologi-
cal failure).58 For all of its benefits however, Blockchain poses 
several regulatory challenges including costs of enforcement and 
anonymity.59 
                                                                                                                        
48 Id. at 353. 
49 See David J. Phillips, Cryptography Secrets and the Structure of Trust, in 
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 24 (Philip Agre & Marc 
Rotenberg eds., 2001). 
50 See Baker, supra note 45, at 354. 
51 See id. at 357; see also Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: 
Currency Versus Trustless Transfer Technology 7 (OECD Working Papers on 
Finance, Insurance, and Private Pensions, Working Paper No. 37, 2014). 
52 See Baker, supra note 45, at 357. 
53 See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash Sys-
tem, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/RES6-GLQ6]. 
54 See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital Cur-
rency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 
172 (2012). 
55 See Nakamoto, supra note 53, at 119. 
56 Paul Farmer, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need 
for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 88–89 (2014). 
57 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 7; see also Ryan Surujnath, 
Off the Chain! A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the Implications 
on Systemic Risk, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 269?70 (2017). 
58 Surujnath, supra note 57, at 261. 
59 See generally Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin 
Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 218, 221 (2014). 
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B. Distinguishing Blockchain From Smart Contracts 
A widely cited use of Blockchain is to create “smart con-
tracts”?a blockchain-hosted60 and executed61 agreement that relies 
on computer code to be “self-executing” (as opposed to relying on 
third parties, like lawyers or courts for condition settlement, execu-
tion, and remedies).62 The process of “uploading” a smart contract to 
the Blockchain varies depending on the Blockchain, but one of the 
most popular cryptocurrency applications, Ethereum (ETH),63 was 
designed to facilitate smart contracts.64 ETH differs from BTC in 
that instead of tracking “ownership of digital currency” it simply 
provides a means of “running the programming code of any decen-
tralized application.”65 Like BTC, ETH has a cryptocurrency 
(Ether), but the purpose of Ether is not to replace money but rather 
to monetize developers to “build and run distributed applications.”66 
                                                                                                                        
60 The benefit of hosting a smart contract on a Blockchain is the creation of 
a “golden” record and the ability for contractual automation. See ISDA 2017 
WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 9: 
DLT allows the code to be embedded in the distributed ledger. 
This means there is only one ‘golden’ version, which effectively 
binds both parties. More importantly, once the code is switched 
on, the parties can take comfort from the fact that it will self-
execute automatically and neither party can tamper with that. 
This is what is meant when smart contracts are described as 
‘self-enforcing.’ There should be no need to resort to the courts 
to enforce the legal contract for payment because, when the 
relevant event occurs, failure to pay is not something that can 
happen within the code. 
61 See id. at 8. 
62 See Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 263, 266–67, 275 (2017) (“Smart contracts enable firms to transact 
without the need for law or courts. They can autonomously negotiate with other 
parties (or other parties’ smart contracts), and then attach directly to the parties’ 
information systems so that goods or payment promised by the contract are auto-
matically delivered.”); see also Jacob Rund, ISDA to Increase Focus on ‘Smart’ Con-
tracts, Trade Automation, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ROLL CALL (Mar. 8, 2017). 
63 “Ethereum is an open software platform based on blockchain technology 
that enables developers to build and deploy decentralized applications.” See Ameer 
Rosic, What is Ethereum? A Step by Step Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS (Mar. 12, 
2017), https://blockgeeks.com/guides/ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/Z3WV-B87E]. 
64 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 273; see also ETHEREUM, https://www 
.ethereum.org [http://perma.cc/4JYY-Q5AF]. 
65 Rosic, supra note 63. 
66 Prableen Bajpai, Bitcoin vs. Ethereum: Driven by Different Purposes, IN-
VESTOPEDIA (Aug. 12, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles 
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C. Smart Contract Foundations and Operational Mechanics 
In its most basic definition, ISDA defines a smart contract 
as “the automation and self-execution (and thereby enforcement) 
of a pre-set conditional action.”67 As such, a smart contract “op-
erate[s] without the need for human legal interpretation”68 and 
can be “nested” with other smart contracts to scale complexity.69 
Computer scientist Nick Szabo70 first coined the term “smart con-
tract” in the mid-1990s and described it as a contract “embedded 
in the hardware and software we deal with, in such a way as to 
make breach of contract expensive.”71 Szabo suggested that smart 
contracts would solve the “computational and transaction costs” 
of agreement design, execution, and default remedy through the 
use of “protocols, users interfaces, and promises expressed via those 
interfaces.”72 By way of interesting context, Szabo also created 
“bit gold”73 (a predecessor to BTC), attended law school “for fun,”74 
                                                                                                                        
/investing/031416/bitcoin-vs-ethereum-driven-different-purposes.asp [http://perma 
.cc/2UMN-EPRS]. 
67 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 5. 
68 Gabrielle Orum Hernandez, With Contract Automation, Ambition Doesn’t 
Always Align with Reality, LEGALTECH NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:46 AM), https:// 
www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202782521057/ [http://perma.cc/B5FG-B8J4]. 
69 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 273. 
70 See Richtopia, The 100 Most Influential Blockchain People (May 9, 2018, 
6:33 PM), https://www.rise.global/top-fintech-people/p/5824542/r/2520358 [http:// 
perma.cc/3UHR-Q4VJ]; see also Antonio Madeira, 30 Most Influential People 
In The Blockchain Space, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.cryp 
tocompare.com/coins/guides/30-most-influential-people-in-the-blockchain-space/ 
[http://perma.cc/24PT-L8KG]. 
71 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, EXTROPY 
#16 (1996), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CD 
ROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2
.html [http://perma.cc/F9Q7-LDQH]. 
72 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Formalization and Securing Relationship 
on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1997), http://firstmonday.org/ojs 
/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469%23Building [http://perma.cc/PFG7-FU7G]. 
73 See generally Nick Szabo, Bit Gold, UNENUMERATED (Dec. 27, 2008, 4:16 
PM), http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2005/12/bit-gold.html [http://perma 
.cc/7GFL-QQQ8]. 
74 Shane Ferro, The alleged Bitcoin founder went to law school for fun? 
and that says a lot about what Bitcoin is really for, BUS. INSIDER (May 15, 2015, 
3:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-is-about-property-law-2015-5 
[http://perma.cc/9W6K-QX7A]. 
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and is alleged by some to be the mysterious BTC creator Satoshi 
Nakamoto75 (a claim Szabo has denied).76 
Like BTC, smart contracts are “immutable” (in that they 
cannot be breached) because of what Jeremy Sklaroff describes as 
“decentralized consensus, instantaneous exchange, and complex 
computational states.”77 In other words, there is an automatic 
consequence and remedy if a party defaults (so enforcement is 
eliminated).78 In a well-cited example by Szabo, a lessee defaulting 
on a car payment would trigger automatic responses (like the ter-
mination of digitized keys, or the transfer of funds from a collat-
eral account).79 ISDA points out that smart contracts should be 
                                                                                                                        
75 See Nathaniel Popper, Decoding the Enigma of Satoshi Nakamoto and the 
Birth of Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015 
/05/17/business/decoding-the-enigma-of-satoshi-nakamoto-and-the-birth-of-bit 
coin.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/FY7R-9FEF]. 
76 See Rob Price, The man everyone thinks is the creator of bitcoin gave a 
speech discussing the history of the technology, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2015, 7:49 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nick-szabo-ethereum-bitcoin-blockchain 
-history-satoshi-nakamoto-2015-11?r=UK&IR=T [http://perma.cc/PUS4-TPT9]. 
77 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 273: 
It is written and executed without the need for expensive inter-
mediating institutions; by interacting with devices that monitor 
states of the world and with firms’ internal information sys-
tems, it can check whether conditions are satisfied and then 
instantaneously provide the bargained-for goods or money. And 
it can exist either in isolation or be nested within multiple sets of 
other smart contracts, so that its complexity can scale up to 
meet whatever transaction logic the parties desire. 
78 See id. at 267. See generally Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts 
Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 331?32 (2017). 
79 See Szabo, supra note 72: 
As another example, consider a hypothetical digital security 
system for automobiles. The smart contract design strategy 
suggests that we successively refine security protocols to more 
fully embed in a property the contractual terms which deal with 
it. These protocols would give control of the cryptographic keys 
for operating the property to the person who rightfully owns 
that property, based on the terms of the contract. In the most 
straightforward implementation, the car can be rendered inop-
erable unless the proper challenge-response protocol is completed 
with its rightful owner, preventing theft. But if the car is be-
ing used to secure credit, strong security implemented in this 
traditional way would create a headache for the creditor—the 
repo man would no longer be able to confiscate a deadbeat’s car. 
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distinguished from coded software “automated” contracts (which 
are not new), as true smart contracts use a singular code “em-
bedded in the distributed ledger.”80 ISDA also notes that “smart 
contract code” (computer code automating certain tasks) is differ-
ent from “smart legal contracts” (automated “legal” agreements 
satisfying the doctrinal conditions of offer, acceptance, consider-
ation, intention to contract, and certainty of terms).81 In ISDA’s 
view, “every smart legal contract can be said to contain one or more 
pieces of smart contract code, but not every piece of smart contract 
code comprises a smart legal contract.”82 Also, smart contracts may 
require some element of human oversight and intervention.83 
The benefits of smart contracts include transactional effi-
ciency and minimization of monitoring and enforcement costs,84 as 
well as “the integrity of data.”85 However, as identified by Jeremy 
Sklaroff in a recent University of Pennsylvania Law Review article, 
smart contracts also introduce significant costs since they must con-
template “all future states,” and there is uncertainty whether con-
templation of all contingencies is possible.86 As such, Sklaroff notes 
that smart contract formation creates an externality “by removing 
                                                                                                                        
To redress this problem, we can create a smart lien protocol: if 
the owner fails to make payments, the smart contract invokes 
the lien protocol, which returns control of the car keys to the 
bank. This protocol might be much cheaper and more effective 
than a repo man. A further reification would probably remove 
the lien when the loan has been paid. 
80 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 9. 
81 See id. at 6 (“For a smart legal contract, there would need to be a legal 
contract satisfying the requirements of the relevant governing law, but with some 
element of that legal contract being electronically automated. With smart con-
tract code, in contrast, there might exist no legal contract at all.”). 
82 Id. at 5. 
83 Id. 
84 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 78, at 317?18. See generally Harry 
Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 689?90 (2012). 
85 See Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 275. 
86 See id. at 277: 
The transactional relationship created by a smart contract be-
tween two firms must be completely formed and precisely defined, 
eliminating forms of flexibility that are crucial to the contracting 
process. In this sense, the transaction costs of entering into smart 
contracts may actually be higher than those associated with 
traditional semantic contracts. 
382 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:369 
enforcement flexibility.”87 As a result, Professors Kevin Werbach 
and Nicolas Cornell argue that smart contracts have a “funda-
mentally different purpose” from conventional contracts88 and 
given formation costs and application drawbacks, there is a mea-
sure of uncertainty as to whether they will ever fully supplant 
traditional forms.89 
                                                                                                                        
87 Id.: 
Parties that cannot build bespoke contracts prefer to avoid lit-
igation and resolve contract disputes informally. Litigation over 
generic contracts is unpredictable and extremely costly, incentiviz-
ing parties to bootstrap their relationship?their history of busi-
ness and the promise of more business in the future?as a cheap 
way to constrain opportunistic behavior. Smart contracts re-
move these informal strategies from parties’ range of responses 
to breach. Once initialized, a smart contract creates a perma-
nent and unalterable link between the terms of the contract 
and the information systems it manipulates, lasting until the 
transaction is complete. Without the ability to flexibly enforce 
their agreement, parties who determined that custom legal 
agreements were too expensive will instead be forced to rely 
on customized and equally expensive blocks of code. 
See also id. at 277?78. 
88 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 78, at 318:  
While smart contracts can meet the doctrinal requirements of 
contract law, they serve a fundamentally different purpose. 
Contract law is a remedial institution. Its aim is not to ensure 
performance ex ante, but to adjudicate the grievances that may 
arise ex post. Smart contracts bring this core function of con-
tract law into sharper relief, as they eliminate the act of re-
mediation by admitting no possibility of breach. But, the needs 
that gave rise to contract law do not disappear. If the parties 
do not or cannot represent all possible outcomes of the smart 
contract arrangement ex ante, the results may diverge from 
their mutual intent. The parties’ expression may also not pro-
duce legally sanctioned outcomes, as in the case of duress, un-
conscionability, or illegality. Promise-oriented disputes and 
grievances will not disappear, but their complexions will shift. 
In such scenarios, either the parties or the state will seek to 
reintroduce the machinery of contractual adjudication. Once 
one properly appreciates what is?and what is not?the func-
tion of contract law, it becomes evident that the reports of its 
death are “greatly exaggerated.” 
89 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 300?02. 
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D. Introducing Credit Default Swaps 
CDSs were invented in 1991 by Bankers Trust and later re-
fined by the investment banking arm of J.P. Morgan in the mid-
1990s.90 A CDS is fundamentally a hedge91 against credit risk,92 
where a purchaser buys protection against a “credit event” on an 
underlying asset.93 If the credit event occurs during a prescribed 
time frame the protection seller indemnifies the purchaser (and 
if the event doesn’t occur then the seller keeps the premium).94 
In practice, CDSs are often much more complicated.95 Pre-GFC, 
                                                                                                                        
90 See JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, 
CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING 
BUSINESS 192 (1st ed. 2014). 
91 The use of CDSs to hedge risk has been criticized, however, see Fletcher, 
supra note 21, at 897: 
The use of credit derivatives to neutralize risk exposure is, it-
self, fraught with risks. Firms that choose to offset risks with 
these complex instruments may be exposed to different risks, 
including counterparty risk, convergence risk, basis risk, or 
codependent risk. To decide whether a transaction is a true 
hedge, therefore, the inquiry should not focus on the intent of 
the parties or on the source of the risk; rather, a true hedge 
should be determined by looking at whether the benefits of the 
transaction outweigh the costs. While balancing the costs against 
the expected benefits of the transaction seems straightforward, 
firms and the markets are limited in their ability to accurately 
gauge the costs of using credit derivatives to hedge. Asymmet-
rical information and negative externalities affect the ability of 
firms to account for the costs of hedging with credit derivatives. 
Regulation is needed to force parties to account for costs that 
they would otherwise fail to incorporate when deciding how to 
value the costs of credit derivatives used to manage risk exposure. 
See also Patrick A. Jackman & John R. Wilson, Using Derivatives to Have Your 
Cake and Eat It, Too, 24 COLO. L. 2213 (1995). See generally Bernard J. Karol, 
An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
195, 197 (1995). 
92 Jongho Kim, Can Risks be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons from 
the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 31 (2008). See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than 
Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding De-
rivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (1997). 
93 See generally Fletcher, supra note 21, at 828. 
94 Id. at 828?29. 
95 Consider for example during the GFS, CDS were sold by AIG on opaque 
structures like mortgage backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs). See TAUB, supra note 90, at 192?93: 
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CDSs traded “over the counter”96 and operated without central 
clearing97 (post-GFC reforms introduced mandatory clearing for 
many standardized CDSs and also exchanged trading through or-
ganized swap execution facilities).98 In 2016, the Intercontinental 
Exchange (“ICE”) debuted a trading platform99 for clearing “single-
name credit default swaps,”100 signaling a departure from bank 
oversight of CDS trading and allowing for wider market partici-
pation.101 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
                                                                                                                        
Early on, the loans and bonds on which AIG sold credit pro-
tection were fairly transparent. But when they began to sell 
CDSs for residential MBSs and CDOs based on them, the clarity 
vanished. The names and credit histories of the underlying home-
owners were not shared with investors in these mortgage-
linked securities. 
Also, the opacity of CDS was increased through the use of “synthetic” 
structures. See Synthetic CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com 
/terms/s/syntheticcdo.asp [http://perma.cc/53SK-4WR2]. 
96 Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives (Continued), 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 747, 747 (1997). See generally Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How 
Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and 
Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995); William F. 
Stutts, The Derivative as Fiend: Killer Bunny or Trojan Rabbit?, 36 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 827 (2001). 
97 Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1303?05 (2010); see also Jared M. 
Burden, Blowing Bubbles: Participations, Derivatives, and How Sharing Risk 
Creates Banking Crisis, 45 TULSA L. REV. 551, 572 (2010). The non-cleared 
OTC derivatives market has been widely cited as a significant contributor to the 
GFC. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit 
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 34 (2011). 
98 See generally Donal Gallagher et al., Daisy Chains and Non-Cleared OTC 
Derivatives, QUATERNION RISK MGMT. (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.quaternion 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Optimisation_White_Paper_0_1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/39ST-ZACB]. 
99 See Credit Default Swaps: Growth in Clearing and Futures, INTERCONTI-
NENTAL EXCHANGE INC., https://www.theice.com/article/cds-growth [http://perma 
.cc/XSZ3-79RF]. 
100 See Christopher L. Culp, Andria van der Merwe & Bettina J. Stärkle, 
Single-Name Credit Default Swaps: A Review of Empirical Academic Literature, 
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVE ASS’N, at v (Sept. 2016), https://www.isda.org/a 
/KSiDE/single-name-cds-literature-review-culp-van-der-merwe-staerkle-isda.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2AWG-U3F5]; see also Vincent Basulto & Richard J. Lee, 
Single-Name Credit Default Swaps: A Primer, LEXOLOGY (May 2, 2016), https:// 
www.rkollp.com/assets/htmldocuments/Single-Name%20Credit%20Default%20 
Swaps%20A%20Primer.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQX3-RZS2]. 
101 See Sridhar Natarajan & Matthew Leising, ICE Said to Let Investors 
Bypass Banks in Credit-Swap Trades, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2016, 10:36 AM), 
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regulatory jurisdiction over “security-based swaps”102 (which in-
cludes most “single name credit default swaps”)103 and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over 
“swaps” (including CDS index classes104?which are standardized, 
centrally cleared, traded (through a swap execution facility), and 
benefit from higher liquidity).105 
The primary contracting vehicle for non-cleared OTC CDSs 
is the ISDA Master Agreement (“MA”).106 The MA contains stan-
dardized terms for efficiency but can also be uniquely customized107 
(which customization takes place in the schedules to the MA, the 
credit support annex, the confirmations, and the product specific 
definitions—all of which together form, along with the MA, a “single 
contract,” which format allows for multiple trades, established in 
confirmations under one MA).108 The MA also provides for continu-
ing regulatory compliance through a “multilateral contractual 
amendment mechanism” called a “Protocol.”109 Post-GFC legislative 
                                                                                                                        
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/ice-said-to-let-investors 
-bypass-banks-in-credit-swaps-trading. 
102 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM., FACT SHEET, DEFINING SWAPS-
RELATED TERMS, https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/press-release-2012-67---related 
-materials.html [http://perma.cc/6ZQZ-XLC8]. 
103 Id. A “single name credit default swap” is only one type of credit default 
swap. Credit default swaps also encompass a range of other credit derivative 
products including credit default index swaps and credit default swaps on a 
“basket of entities.” See EDUPRISTINE, Credit Derivatives Explained in Detail 
(Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.edupristine.com/blog/credit-derivatives-in-detail [http:// 
perma.cc/QSX6-RZ86]. 
104 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., CFTC ISSUES CLEARING 
DETERMINATION FOR CERTAIN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6429-12 [http:// 
perma.cc/TT62-6SN4]. 
105 See generally Acheson, supra note 22. 
106 It has been estimated that ISDA Master Agreements are used in over 90 
percent of OTC CDSs. See Ian Acker, Strength in Transparency: Mitigating 
Systemic Risk Through Harmonization of Reporting Requirements for OTC 
Derivatives, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 970 (2017). 
107 See id. at 953, 970–71. 
108 See LEXIS BANKING & FINANCE PSL, Scope of the ISDA Master Agreement 
and Schedule—Overview, https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/bankingand 
finance/document/391289/57X4-8841-F185-X2H3-00000-00/ [https://perma.cc 
/7BQ9-GRMY]. 
109 Protocol Overview, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2 
.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-protocols, [https:// 
perma.cc/5WGY-CHFR] (“The fundamental benefit to an adhering party to a 
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provisions contained in the DFA110 introduced “swap data repos-
itories” (“SDR”) as a mechanism for containing systemic risk by 
maintaining what Ian Acker calls a “centralized electronic data-
base for OTC derivatives transactions”;111 however, because of cer-
tain SDR indemnification provisions in the DFA,112 it has been 
estimated that only “sixty to eighty percent” of the U.S. OTC credit 
derivatives market is reported to regulators.113 
E. ISDA’s Vision for a Smart Contract Master Agreement 
Framework 
ISDA (together with Linklaters) has identified that, in a 
CDS, the “main payments and deliveries are heavily dependent 
on conditional logic.”114 As such, they have outlined a potential 
CDS OTC Blockchain framework that could be used to record 
transactions (the “golden record”), warehouse data, give access to 
                                                                                                                        
protocol is that it eliminates the necessity for costly and time-consuming bi-
lateral negotiations.”); see also Acker, supra note 106, at 972 explaining: 
Examples of protocols that promote compliance with local U.S. 
and European regulatory requirements include the Dodd-Frank 
Protocol, which facilitates implementation of various CFTC 
rulemakings, and the EMIR Protocol, which, inter alia, does the 
same for new portfolio reconciliation, dispute resolution, and 
disclosure protocols. Additionally, ISDA’s Working Group on 
Margin Requirements (WGMR) issued a final protocol creating a 
policy framework for margin requirements for non-cleared OTC 
derivatives that official regulators in individual jurisdictions 
use as a model for their own markets—a prime example of ISDA 
promoting its own policies successfully. Protocols issued by 
ISDA are optional and only go into effect when both parties to 
the Master Agreement “adhere” to it. More than just a buzzword, 
adherence to ISDA protocols by members is a specific process 
that must be performed via the association’s website and in-
volves the transmittance of firm-specific information. 
See also MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, 
FIN. REG.: LAW & POL’Y, 1115 (2016) (“As of December 31, 2015, ISDA has 
developed two primary Dodd-Frank Act business conduct protocols, which ad-
dresses the CFTC’s rules on (1) swap trading documentation, (2) the end-user 
exception to the clearing requirement, and (3) portfolio reconciliation. Each of 
these protocols had close to 17,000 adhering parties.”). 
110 See 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). 
111 Acker, supra note 106, at 964. 
112 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 728, 763 (2012). 
113 Acker, supra note 106, at 965. 
114 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 19. 
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regulators, host the smart contracts (or smart contract code), and 
also be programmed to execute automatically when conditional com-
mands are satisfied.115 In order to establish this framework, they 
suggest that ledger participants (financial institutions) could be 
given a “unique private key” which would also act as an “electronic 
signature” and when integrated with smart contract code could 
validate signing authority.116 They also note that the MA could be 
written in formal language “tractable by computers” or written in 
“natural language” with references to code stored elsewhere.117 As 
suggested by technology consultant Breana Patel, the smart con-
tract CDS could also be written to adhere with “collateral, swap and 
margin” regulatory requirements, and also execute automatically 
through conditional logic programmed in the Blockchain code.118 
A CDS must have a “credit event” determination.119 This 
would need to be contemplated in the smart contract and ISDA, 
pursuant to its 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, has sug-
gested that credit event determinations by a “Determination Com-
mittee” (DC) could lead to an automatic triggering of a payment 
without notification.120 A smart contract CDS would also need to in-
tegrate code-making references to the DC as a “third party oracle.”121 
ISDA also suggests that “Definitions Booklets” would need 
to be amended so that they “lend themselves to the application 
                                                                                                                        
115 See id. at 19–21. 
116 Id. at 21.  
117 Id. at 19. 
118 Breana Patel, Blockchain in Capital Markets, FINEXTRA (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/15096/blockchain-in-capital-markets [https:// 
perma.cc/3ZGU-8L2C].  
119 See The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Comms., ISDA (MAY 
2012), https://www.isda.org/a/CHDDE/agm-2012-dc-anniversary-appendix-0430 
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2DD-ZKBW].  
120 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 18. 
121 Id.; see also Surujnath, supra note 57, at 274:  
Oracles use multi-sig to incorporate outside information into the 
blockchain. An oracle serves as an additional signatory that 
attests to information that is not tracked by the blockchain. It 
can reference an agreed upon data source and serve as an ad-
ditional signature to a transaction that is contingent on a real-
world event. Once the required condition is met, the oracle 
signs the transaction with its private key to effectuate the trans-
action. In a trading system that relies on numerous ledgers to 
keep track of different assets, the oracle can facilitate a payment 
that is contingent on a factor tracked by another blockchain. 
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of conditional logic.”122 Also, a smart contract MA would need to 
be appropriately coded so that they are linked to bank accounts 
to meet initial and variation margin.123 
Given the significant impediments to full operational im-
plementation (as will be presented shortly), ISDA has articulated 
two potential models of smart contract integration.124 The first is 
an “external model” which would preserve the current MA structure 
but use Blockchain embedded smart contract code to automate some 
aspects of the contract so that they happen automatically upon con-
dition satisfaction.125 In this model, the actual contract would “take 
precedence” (in the event of contradictions) over the code, which 
would effectively just serve as a mechanism for more efficient per-
formance and the parties would need to sign off on the code pre-
execution to ensure suitability.126 ISDA has noted that this is really 
only a partial adaptation from what’s already used (for example 
“daily collateral flows” are currently automated in the context of 
maintaining margin requirements.)127 
A second model identified by ISDA is an “internal model” 
resembling a hybrid contract with either a written contract us-
ing “natural human language” for some clauses while describing 
others in computer code, or a written contract making reference to 
code in another place.128 In this model, the code is actually “part” of 
the written contract.129 To this end, ISDA has suggested a number 
of possibilities: either create a new programming language (which 
lawyers would need to learn) or use an existing language that’s for 
smart contracts130 (like Ethereum’s Solidity).131 The thought of law-
yers being responsible for code that is legally binding could trigger 
                                                                                                                        
122 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 20. 
123 See Kari S. Larsen, Brett Hillis & Michael Selig, Suitability Of Swaps Doc-




124 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 14–17. 




129 Id. at 16. 
130 See id. at 15. 
131 Solidity is a “contract-oriented” programming language used for creating 
smart contracts. See The Greeter, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/greeter 
[https://perma.cc/8JGX-TLHR]. 
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a collective shudder throughout the derivatives transactional bar, 
thus ISDA suggests an “industry standard” code would likely need 
to be produced.132 ISDA notes however that a singular coding lan-
guage may not be “interoperable” across a variety of Blockchains.133 
F. Legal Recognition, Electronic Execution, and Jurisdictional 
Enforceability Issues 
In the next two subsections, the Article will outline some 
of the problems with fully implementing an ISDA MA with a smart 
contract. First, there is some uncertainty on the legal enforceability 
of smart contracts altogether;134 although several states including 
Arizona,135 Delaware,136 Vermont,137 Nevada,138 New Hamp-
shire,139 Hawaii,140 and Illinois141 have initiated smart contract 
                                                                                                                        
132 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 17. 
133 Id. at 15. 
134 See generally Craig A. de Ridder, Mercedes K. Tunstall & Nathalie Prescott, 
Recognition of Smart Contracts in the United States, 29 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2017). 
135 See H.R. 2417, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017); see also de Ridder, 
Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17:  
More recently, Arizona introduced the so-called “Smart Contract 
Bill” in early February, and it quickly landed on the governor’s 
desk for signature on March 29. Arizona’s new statute does more 
than recognize the legality of smart contracts—it also brings any 
signature, record, or contract that is “secured through block-
chain technology” within the ambit of the state’s Electronic Trans-
actions Act. Other jurisdictions could recognize smart contracts 
under existing state laws modeled on the Uniform Electronic 
Transaction Act or the federal Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, without having to pass smart 
contract, or blockchain technology, specific legislation. 
136 See Joshua Ashley Klayman, Geoffrey R. Peck & Mark S. Wojciechowski, 
Why The Delaware Blockchain Initiative Matters To All Dealmakers, FORBES 
(Sept. 20, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/09/20/why 
-the-delaware-blockchain-initiative-matters-to-all-dealmakers/#45d6529c7550 
[https://perma.cc/K9VG-CKUD]; see also Michael del Castillo, Delaware House 
Passes Historic Blockchain Regulation, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/Dela 
ware-house-passes-historic-blockchain-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/FV2G-3NXY]. 
137 See Stan Higgins, Vermont Could Collect Taxes in Crypto Under Proposed 
Law, COINDESK (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/vermont-collect-taxes 
-crypto-proposed-law/ [https://perma.cc/LJ6E-X7YY]. 
138 See H.R. 398, 79th Leg. (Nev. 2017).  
139 See H.R. 436, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017). 
140 See H.R. 1481, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017). 
141 See H.R. 120, 100th General Assem. (Ill. 2017–2018). 
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recognition legislation, or state-driven Blockchain initiatives to pro-
vide greater support for their legal validity.142 Further, significant 
business projects are currently underway using smart contracts 
including the Brooklyn Microgrid solar energy project, the Cali-
fornia “Share & Charge” electronic vehicle platform, a multibank 
“syndicated loan servicing program,” and Nasdaq’s New York 
Interactive Advertising Exchange.143 Next, there is some juris-
dictional uncertainty for electronic execution and on this point 
ISDA has commissioned “e-contract opinions” from a number of 
locations to determine viability.144 
Also, ISDA has noted that there is some uncertainty, when 
using Blockchain across international borders with respect to the 
“situs” or location of assets.145 
G. Partial or Full Integration: Transaction Costs and Strategic 
Considerations 
Smart contracts may, as technology writer Robin Moody 
describes, reduce the cost of “managing mass repapering and re-
negotiations,” and also provide “data extraction” efficiencies;146 
however, there are many aspects of smart contracts that make full 
OTC CDS integration questionable.147 The previous section in-
troduced several legal uncertainties in relation to enforceability 
and jurisdiction.148 This Section will build on those concerns and 
focus on specific practical and strategic challenges related to the 
contract operation itself. First, as noted by lawyer Gernot Fritz, 
                                                                                                                        
142 See de Ridder, Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17 (“Other juris-
dictions could recognize smart contracts under existing state laws modeled on 
the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act or the federal Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act, without having to pass smart contract, or 
blockchain technology, specific legislation.”). 
143 Id. at 18–19. 
144 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 21. 
145 Id. at 9. 
146 Robin Moody, Derivatives Document Management—How Do Smart Con-
tracts Fit In?, DERIVSOURCE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://derivsource.com/2016/09/20 
/derivatives-document-management-how-do-smart-contracts-fit-in-2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W77E-9ZBG]. 
147 See Gernot Fritz, What’s in a smart contract, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS 
DERINGER BLOG, https://www.freshfields.com/en-us/our-thinking/campaigns/digi 
tal/fintech/whats-in/whats-in-a-smart-contract/ [https://perma.cc/G3DY-C347]. 
148 See de Ridder, Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17–18; see also 
ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 20. 
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smart contracts are final and cannot be undone, modified or re-
vised (the Blockchain prevents this), so void, or mistaken contracts 
require additional programming, and remain on the Blockchain—
this creates an additional risk, and potential transaction cost.149 
Next, as pointed out by Ryan Surujnath in a recent Fordham 
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law article, a single party, 
even with the consent of the other counterparty, cannot “edit” a 
Blockchain to “reverse a transaction” or to satisfy a judicial order.150 
To avoid such a situation, ISDA suggests that CDS counterpar-
ties consider all contingencies up front,151 but they also acknowl-
edge this may be unrealistic and the cost of such activity could 
easily outweigh the potential benefits.152 
Next, even if one could identify all potential contingencies, 
ISDA points out that some contractual provisions are “subjective 
or require interpretation”153 and that provisions requiring “good 
faith” or “commercially reasonable” interpretations can have differ-
ent meanings in different jurisdictions.154 ISDA further notes that a 
self-executing smart contract could lead to automatic performance 
that is unauthorized by law,155 and automation may not be wanted 
at all—for example in the 2002 ISDA MA, on an “Event of De-
fault,”156 the non-defaulting party has a right of termination157 but 
they may not want to automatically terminate the agreement if it is 
in their economic best interest to keep it open (or some other factor 
warrants keeping the contract alive),158 and the determination of 
                                                                                                                        
149 Fritz, supra note 147. 
150 Surujnath, supra note 57, at 284, 295. 
151 See generally ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 13. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 3. 
154 Id. at 11. 
155 Id. 
156 See § 5(a) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement. 
157 See id. § 6(a). 
158 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 17–18: 
The reasons for that decision tend to be subjective, depending 
on the commercial and relationship context at the time of the 
event, the nature of the default, and other external factors (e.g., 
proceedings that may occur under applicable law because of 
the default). This would not seem to be susceptible to prepro-
gramming. That does not mean a legal contract cannot have 
elements of it ‘made smart’. It simply means these events would 
not be automatically triggered (although they could lead to auto-
matic alerts, which would be useful). 
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which course to take is best made at the time of default, after 
careful consideration of the context.159 
An example of strategic self-selection against automation 
can be found in Section 2(a)(iii)(1) of the 2002 ISDA MA, which pro-
vides that payments or delivery obligations of parties are subject 
to a “condition precedent” that there are no “Events of Default” or 
“Potential Events of Default.”160 In an MA negotiating strategy in-
dustry article, lawyer GuyLaine Charles suggests that in an “Event 
of Default” a non-defaulting party may want to keep trades open 
(for instance if a party is “net out of the money on all trades”) 
but stop making payments or deliveries to the defaulting party (in 
reliance on Section 2(a)(iii)(1)) and at the same time force the de-
faulting party to continue making payments to them.161 She adds 
this strategy can have a significantly negative impact on a de-
faulting party, and the non-defaulting party’s choice of pursuing 
this route is contextual on economic factors of the trade at the 
time, and there might be multiple avenues of pursuit for a non-
defaulting party in relation to the valuation of an early termination 
                                                                                                                        
159 See id. 
160 See § 2(a)(iii)(1) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement; see also GuyLaine 
Charles, The ISDA Master Agreement—Part II: Negotiated Provisions, PRACTICAL 
COMPLIANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (May–June 
2012) at 40:  
The non-defaulting party may choose not to terminate its trades 
under the ISDA, perhaps because it is net out of the money on 
all trades, and yet may cease performing in reliance on these 
provisions. In the meantime, the defaulting party is still required 
to make timely payments, deliveries and margin transfers to 
the non-defaulting party. Section 2(a)(iii)(1) allows the non-
defaulting party to game the market by refusing to terminate 
its transactions under the Agreement until it is beneficial to 
do so, or when the market swings in its favour. 
161 Charles, supra note 160, at 40:  
The non-defaulting party may choose not to terminate its trades 
under the ISDA, perhaps because it is net out of the money on 
all trades, and yet may cease performing in reliance on these 
provisions. In the meantime, the defaulting party is still required 
to make timely payments, deliveries and margin transfers to 
the non-defaulting party. Section 2(a)(iii)(1) allows the non-
defaulting party to game the market by refusing to terminate 
its transactions under the Agreement until it is beneficial to 
do so, or when the market swings in its favour. 
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payment.162 For example, in the 2002 ISDA MA when there is an 
“Event of Default”163 or a “Termination Event,”164 the non-
defaulting party (called a “Determining Party”) has the flexibility to 
determine a “Close-Out Amount”165 and in determining this amount 
may consider third party quotations, market data, and internally 
derived sources.166 ISDA has opined that the “Close Out Amount” 
choice was provided to Determining Parties to give them flexibil-
ity167 to use contextual factors to determine the best means of 
calculating the Close Out Amount.168 Preprogramming arguably 
removes this benefit.169 
Another argument against full smart contract integration 
identified by ISDA is that “operational clauses” in the MA (like 
contingent payments, “options exercise” clauses, settlement set-offs, 
and asset transfer clauses)170 are more easily drafted as “condi-
tional logic” expressible through machine-automation171—while 
“non-operational” clauses (like governing law,172 jurisdiction,173 
integration,174 enforceability, or other representations)175 are not 
as easily translated into computer expression.176 Also, ISDA points 
out that what the parties agree on must align with what the code 
                                                                                                                        
162 See id.: 
Excess collateral and settlement payments owed to the defaulting 
party may be withheld by the non-defaulting party, thereby creat-
ing or further deepening the defaulting party’s credit problems. 
This lack of liquidity may cause the defaulting party to default on 
its obligations with other trading counterparties, triggering a 
wave of defaults that leads to the defaulting party’s demise. 
163 See § 5(a) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement. 
164 See id. § 5(b). 
165 See id. § 2(c). 
166 See Charles, supra note 160, at 33–35. 
167 See ISDA Close-Out Amount Protocol, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2009), https:// 
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfb7f4c4-ab5b-4b30-933f-730cfee24b91 
[https://perma.cc/3RWT-LWCX]. 
168 See id. 
169 See Charles, supra note 160, at 33–34. 
170 See § 6.1 ISDA 2006 Definitions; see also §§ 8.1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5 ISDA 2002 
Equity Derivative Definitions. 
171 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 11. 
172 See § 13(a) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement. 
173 See id. § 13(b). 
174 See id. § 9(a). 
175 See id. § 3(a)(v). 
176 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 11–12. 
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actually says and what happens when it is automated.177 As a re-
sult, lawyers would need to either develop computer-programming 
acumen, or involve technologists (thus increasing costs and opening 
up lawyer-client confidentiality concerns).178 ISDA also questions 
whether one “coding language” is sufficient for smart contracts (or 
whether multiple are required).179 Given these criticisms, some 
commentators question whether permissioned Blockchain may 
provide little “beyond a traditional database or a basic messaging 
service” and may be just another “walled off network.”180 Also, it is 
possible that a status quo bias could motivate a slow integration 
process.181 As a result, at least in the short run, ISDA and Link-
laters recommends “automating” certain tasks in the MA (via smart 
contract code) rather than replacing the MA all together.182 
II. HOW WOULD PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN IMPACT CDS  
POST-TRADE FUNCTIONALITY, PROCESSING, AND  
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE? 
A. Inefficiencies in the Current CDS Post-Trade Processing 
Framework & Potential Efficiency Gains From Blockchain 
In a press release for a 2016 whitepaper183 on “Embracing 
Disruption,” DTCC stated that Blockchain could “modernize, 
streamline and simplify the siloed design of the financial indus-
try infrastructure and address certain limitations of the current 
post trade process”184 and that Blockchain is the “virtual opposite” 
of the traditional processing structure.185 DTCC has identified 
                                                                                                                        
177 See id. at 17 (“The second potential area of difference is illustrated by the 
question: ‘how do I know the effect of the code, when executed by a machine, will 
be what I intend?’”). 
178 See generally Fritz, supra note 147. 
179 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 15. 
180 See Nordrum, supra note 32. 
181 See Moody, supra note 146. 
182 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 3. 
183 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14. 
184 See New DTCC White Paper Calls for Leveraging Distributed Ledger Tech-
nology to Solve Certain Long-Standing Operational Challenges, DEPOSITORY 
TRUST & CLEARING CORP. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/Janu 
ary/25/new-dtcc-white-paper-calls-for-leveraging-distributed-ledger-technology 
[https://perma.cc/NSY2-L3WJ]. 
185 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 1. 
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Blockchain as potentially useful for issuing and servicing assets 
and securities, managing data, validating trades and contracts, net-
ting, clearing, and settlement,186 and that Blockchain could also 
potentially remedy four financial processing weaknesses: “siloed” 
systems with human error discrepancies; unneeded complexity; sus-
ceptibility to hacks; and no “24/7/365 processing” abilities.187 DTCC 
also notes that Blockchain may reduce “manual interactions, data 
exchanges, data format conversions and reconciliations with other 
systems.”188 DTCC identifies however several areas where Block-
chain frameworks fall short, including database functionality (like 
in high-speed searching, retrieval, and reporting functions)189 as 
well as requiring costly computing and storage capacity.190 
Under the current processing framework for CDS, there is 
potential for human error when, as technology reporter Laura Shin 
notes, information gets “entered into multiple databases in different 
ways.”191 For example, a trade may be recorded initially then al-
tered when processed by operations (and further edited by risk 
management and again by the credit department).192 ISDA in a 
September 2017 whitepaper on Data and Process Standards,193 has 
identified several “stakeholders” who might benefit by adopting a 
Blockchain processing framework including “market participants,” 
regulators, “market infrastructure providers,” and “fintech and solu-
tion providers.”194 In a separate whitepaper on “The Future of De-
rivative Processing and Market Infrastructure,” ISDA also suggests 
that for market participants, operating expenses and inefficiencies 
could be decreased through a “Golden Record” processing model 
with a “single representation of a transaction.”195 This singular 
                                                                                                                        
186 See id. at 2. 
187 See id. at 5. 
188 See id. at 12. 
189 See id. at 8. 
190 See id. at 9. 
191 See Laura Shin, DTCC Partners With IBM, Startups For Blockchain-Based 
Credit Default Swaps Solution, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/01/09/dtcc-selects-partners-for-blockchain-so 
lution-for-credit-default-swaps/#c56f49750619. 
192 See id. 
193 See WHITE PAPER: DATA & PROCESS STANDARDS, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVA-
TIVES ASS’N CDM (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter ISDA DATA PROCESS]. 
194 See id. at 10. 
195 See ISDA FUTURE PROCESSING, supra note 29, at 23: 
If structured correctly, this Golden Record may remove the need 
for many of the duplicative reconciliation processes that exist 
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record may also lead to “optimized” collateral and netting proce-
dures and regulatory compliance efficiencies,196 and provide 
regulators with better technological tools to monitor and manage 
systemic risk.197 Additionally, ISDA, in two other whitepapers, 
suggests that “market infrastructure providers” and “fintech and 
solution providers” could add greater benefits through coordinated 
action,198 and the digital “modularisation” of documentation terms 
in a “universal repository” could also be used to enhance individual 
transactions.199 This would allow the ISDA library to be contin-
ually updated instead of the “periodic updates of definitional 
booklets” that currently happens.200 
B. Regulatory Standards: Business Conduct, Reporting, and  
Record-Keeping 
Blockchain integration potentially impacts Swap Dealer’s 
and Security-Based Swap Dealers (collectively “SDs”)201 and Major 
Swap Participant’s and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 
(collectively “MSPs”)202 business conduct, reporting, and record-
keeping obligations pursuant to Title VII of the DFA.203 Pursuant to 
business conduct standards, SDs and MSPs must comply with 
“fair dealing and trade disclosures, written trading documenta-
tion and swap confirmations that contain all applicable terms of 
a swap transaction, and portfolio reconciliation to confirm that 
the terms of their swaps match the terms in the records of their 
                                                                                                                        
today, such as reconciliation for settlement, compression and mar-
gining purposes. More importantly, it will assist market par-
ticipants and regulators to access an accurate and up-to-date 
instance of a transaction at any time, potentially removing or 
reducing some of the current burdens of regulatory reporting. 
196 See id. at 23, 25. 
197 See id. at 25. 
198 See ISDA DATA PROCESS, supra note 193, at 10. 
199 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 22. 
200 See id. at 22. 
201 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)(A) (2012), Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(49)(A); 
see also Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security Based Swap Dealer,” “Ma-
jor Swap Participant,” “Major Security Based-Swap Participant,” and “Eligible 
Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 751–53 (May 23, 2012). 
202 See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security Based Swap Dealer,” 
“Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security Based-Swap Participant,” and “Eligible 
Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 751–53 (May 23, 2012). 
203 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 729, 766 (2012). 
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counter parties.”204 The use of a permissioned Blockchain may 
ease these counterparty verification and disclosure burdens and 
potentially reduce the costs of “portfolio reconciliation,”205 thus 
minimizing potential disputes. Forbes technology reporter Laura 
Shin suggests that in this regard, Blockchain may facilitate a more 
efficient ledger, ensuring information consistency and avoiding 
“fragmented processing” that facilitates errors and risk.206 
Post GFC reform ushered in a host of reporting obligations 
for both cleared and non-cleared swap trades.207 In particular, Sec-
tion 731 of the DFA208 includes heightened reporting, record-
keeping and daily trading records requirements and registration.209 
Specifically SDs and MSPs must “make such reports as are 
required by the Commission by rule or regulation regarding the 
transactions and positions and financial condition of the regis-
tered swap dealer or major swap participant,”210 adhere to pre-
scribed bookkeeping requirements,211 and allow open access to 
the regulators.212 SDs and MSPs are also required to keep daily 
                                                                                                                        
204 See BARR, JACKSON & TAHYAR, supra note 109, at 1112. 
205 See id. at 1113: 
Portfolio reconciliation is a post-trade execution process and a 
risk management tool that is designed to (1) identify and resolve 
any discrepancies between the records of the counterparties re-
garding the terms of a swap and the valuation of the swap; and 
(2) ensure effective confirmation of all terms of the swap. The 
frequency with which parties must engage in portfolio reconcilia-
tion ranges from daily to annually and depends on the number of 
swaps in the counter parties’ portfolio and the parties involved 
(whether one party is an end user). 
206 See Shin, supra note 191. 
207 See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(13)(G), 6r (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(m)(1)(G), 
78m-1 (2012). 
208 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s. 
209 See id. at §§ 6s(f), 6s(g). 
210 See id. at § 6s. 
211 See generally M. Holland West & Matthew K. Kerfoot, The Impact of Dodd-
Frank on Derivatives, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 269, 289–300 (2013). 
212 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f)(1)(B)–(D): 
(B)(i) for which there is a prudential regulator, shall keep books 
and records of all activities related to the business as a swap 
dealer or major swap participant in such form and manner and 
for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission by rule or 
regulation; and (ii) for which there is no prudential regulator, 
shall keep books and records in such form and manner and for 
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trading records,213 counterparty records,214 and an audit trail.215 
Colleen Baker, of the Volcker Alliance, notes that, as a result of the 
reforms, “all swaps and security-based swaps—whether cleared 
or not—must be reported to swap data repositories.”216 Having 
all trading and counterparty information readily available on a 
Blockchain, and providing the regulators access to the ledger can 
reduce the cost of compliance with these reporting provisions and 
provide reporting on an “intraday” basis describes technology writer 
Breana Patel.217 Time delays, however, would need to be pro-
grammed into the Blockchain code for large “block trades” to 
adhere to market regulations and the permissioned Blockchain 
would need to be adjusted to maintain confidentiality in relation 
to market positions and counterparty identity.218 
                                                                                                                        
such period as may be prescribed by the Commission by rule 
or regulation; (C) shall keep books and records described in sub-
paragraph (B) open to inspection and examination by any rep-
resentative of the Commission; and (D) shall keep any such books 
and records relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) of 
this title open to inspection and examination by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
See id. at § 6s(f)(1)(A). 
213 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f)(1)(B)–(D): 
(B)(i) for which there is a prudential regulator, shall keep books 
and records of all activities related to the business as a swap 
dealer or major swap participant in such form and manner 
and for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission 
by rule or regulation; and (ii) for which there is no prudential 
regulator, shall keep books and records in such form and man-
ner and for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission 
by rule or regulation; (C) shall keep books and records described 
in subparagraph (B) open to inspection and examination by any 
representative of the Commission; and (D) shall keep any such 
books and records relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) 
of this title open to inspection and examination by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
214 See § 6s. 
215 See id. at §§ 6s(f), 6s(g). 
216 See Colleen Baker, Clearinghouses for Over-the-Counter Derivatives 15 
(Volcker Alliance, Working Paper, 2016). 
217 Patel, supra note 118. 
218 See West et al., CFTC Issues Guidance on Block Trade and Large No-
tional Off-Facility Swap Rules; Advisors Must Obtain Consent, DECHERT LLP 
(Sept. 2013). 
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C. Central Clearing, Netting, Collateral Management and  
Settlement 
A major tenant of post-GFC derivatives reform was adopt-
ing clearing by central counterparties (“CCPs”) for a variety of pre-
viously OTC CDS.219 Colleen Baker describes this process as a CCP 
stepping “into the middle of an OTC derivative trade and creat[ing] 
two new transactions through a legal process known as nova-
tion.”220 This results in original counterparties being only subject to 
the credit risk of the CCP (rather than to each other)221 and this 
market mechanism is believed to be better than dealer banks in 
managing and absorbing counterparty credit risk,222 and also an 
effective means of reducing the transaction costs involved in net-
ting.223 CCPs have been criticized heavily across a variety of 
academic studies as centralizing the “locus of systemic risk” in swap 
transactions;224 increasing systemic risk in the context of bank-
ruptcy;225 facilitating “fragmented netting;”226 causing “destructive 
coordination” by segmenting assets;227 underpricing risk because 
                                                                                                                        
219 Central clearing is mandatory for “index-based” credit default swaps. 
See Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing The Way To Failure, 
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 589, 590 (2016). 
220 Baker, supra note 216, at 17. 
221 Id. at 18. 
222 See Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case For Derivatives Clearing-
houses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 461 (2013). See generally Baker, supra note 216. 
223 See Baker, supra note 216, at 25. 
224 Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure 
For Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1153 (2012). 
225 See Julia Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A 
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1093 (2016). 
226 Sean J. Griffith, The Derivatives Clearinghouse: Designing A Governance 
Structure To Manage Systemic Risk, 32 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y 
REP. 1, 15–16 (Apr. 2013): 
The rise of multiple clearinghouses means fragmented netting. In 
a world of fragmented netting, the only trades available to a 
clearinghouse to offset losses from a dealer’s default are posi-
tions cleared by that particular clearinghouse, a subset of all open 
positions with the defaulting dealer. Fewer open positions, of 
course, means greater residual loss for the clearinghouse to ab-
sorb, a problem that will be repeated for each clearinghouse in 
which the defaulting member participates. 
See also Baker, supra note 216, at 35. 
227 Griffith, supra note 226, at 16 (“Because ... clearinghouses specialize in 
specific asset classes—for example, foreign exchange, interest rate swaps, or 
credit default swaps (CDS)—they are likely to be susceptible to asset bubbles 
400 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:369 
of “adverse selection”228 (and thereby increasing moral hazard);229 
and perpetuating “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions.230 As a 
result, CCPs may not eliminate risk, but as Colleen Baker states 
merely “transform” it.231 Netting and collateralization (including 
margin requirements) are important ways that CCPs manage de-
fault risk.232 DTCC has identified Blockchain as potentially al-
lowing an “optimized settlement” when considering the netting,233 
clearing,234 and processing235 of CDS transactions to create “value 
transfer, in near real time, independent of a trusted third party.”236 
However DTCC also notes that this comes with significant costs 
and a potential for “bifurcated markets with proprietary settle-
ment and asset management mechanisms.”237 As such, DTCC sug-
gests the opportunity may be more suitable for emerging markets238 
which leads to some commentators doubting whether Blockchain 
will actually supplant CCPs.239 Given that there is still a large por-
tion of the CDS market that is not cleared,240 Ryan Surujnath, in 
                                                                                                                        
in the underlying asset. This is a case of ‘destructive coordination’ brought on 
by regulation.”). 
228 Baker, supra note 216, at 26. 
229 See Levitin, supra note 222, at 463–64; see also id. at 27. 
230 Levitin, supra note 222, at 447. 
231 See Baker, supra note 216, at 5. 
232 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 279. 
233 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 15 (“Netting is defined as an 
optimized settlement requirement between all parties involved in trading an 
asset.”); see also Baker, supra note 216, at 24 (“With multilateral netting, a 
clearinghouse can offset the payment obligations of multiple counterparties (its 
clearing members) so that only counterparties’ net payment obligations—typically 
a much smaller amount than their gross obligations—need to be exchanged with 
the clearinghouse.”). 
234 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 15 (“Clearing is using a cen-
tral counter party for each trade to simplify multiparty netting and reduce risk 
of settlement failure.”). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 16. 
238 Id. 
239 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 281–82. 
240 See Baker, supra note 216, at 33:  
At the end of 2014, about half of all interest rate swaps and a 
fifth of credit default swaps were cleared. The percentages are 
much higher for new transactions: about 80 [percent] of new 
interest rate swaps are cleared and 70 [percent] of new credit 
default swaps based on credit indices are cleared. 
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a recent Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law arti-
cle suggests that Blockchain may impact the non-cleared OTC 
market since it “can assume functions typically undertaken” by 
CCPs and allow users to organize into “distributed autonomous 
organizations” (a function also facilitated by Ethereum).241 
In a Blockchain CDS, collateral calls could be written 
through smart contract code to directly debit bank accounts as the 
market changes242 and in this case technology writer Breana Patel 
frames Blockchain as an “enterprise-wide management” of client 
and firm credit risk.243 ISDA has established the ISDA Collateral 
Infrastructure Committee (“CIC”)244 to develop a blueprint for an 
“optimal future state” of collateral processing that takes into 
consideration scalability, central storage, “interoperability,” and 
automation.245 To this end, certain “observed pain points” identi-
fied by ISDA in the current OTC trading system include costs of 
repetition, a lack of standardization and scalability, delays, and 
problems in resolving disputes.246 Another challenge noted by 
ISDA, which may benefit from Blockchain is “mismatched trades” 
and margin disputes.247 On this point the smart contracts could 
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Firms trading these derivatives could use a blockchain like 
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manages the functions usually conducted by the CCP: valuing 
contracts, calculating initial and variation margins, facilitating 
custody of collateral, handling novation and netting, and manag-
ing closeout. Derivatives are contracts that have calculable 
terms with an “algorithm” expressed through legal terms. Valua-
tions typically present a problem in bilateral markets because 
the two parties compute the algorithms themselves and may 
reach different conclusions on pricing. Blockchains crowdsource 
the calculations and allow the network to reach a consensus 
on their accuracy. Proponents hope that the communal pro-
cess can result in more transparent OTC markets. 
242 See Patel, supra note 118. 
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make reference to an agreed upon benchmarks to adjust margin 
requirements as asset values change.248 
With respect to settlement,249 DTCC has stated that many 
complex swaps can take many weeks (or months) to settle.250 Block-
chain might decrease this time frame; however, as DTCC points 
out, “real time settlement” can actually be achieved right now251 
and changes to settlement conventions require, “revising laws, 
changing market practices and structures” and as such imply a 
level of coordination difficulty.252 DTCC also argues that the logic of 
settlement applies to collateral management since “[t]he prove-
nance of assets, the ability to track transaction movements and, 
with proper design, true ownership vs. temporary/borrowing is 
fundamental to the promise of distributed ledger technology.”253 
D. Trade Validation, Recording, Matching, and Position Limit 
Management 
Breana Patel suggests that Blockchain may facilitate “match-
ing of trades during the settlement process” to avoid errors during 
settlement.254 In a CDS, participating parties use a “matching 
service” to ensure aligning terms which translate into a final agree-
ment and Blockchain might be able to reduce “costly trade and 
payment reconciliations” associated with this process.255 DTCC has 
expressed concern however with using Blockchain for trade vali-
dation, recording and matching because of the issues relating to 
                                                                                                                        
248 See generally Surujnath, supra note 57, at 280–81. 
249 See generally Norman Menachem Feder, Market in the Remaking: Over 
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251 Id. at 16–17. 
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254 Patel, supra note 118:  
Confirm matching of trades during the settlement process can 
be done via smart contracts. If a European bank has transacted 
a swap contract with a U.S. bank, the settlement details would 
only be provided if the financial details of the trade match be-
tween the two banks. The smart contract allows automatic pay-
ment processing, only if certain parameters within the agreed 
upon contract are satisfied. As a result of smart contracts, costly 
errors from the manual processing of settlement instructions 
can be reduced dramatically. 
255 See Nordrum, supra note 32. 
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finality and singular ledger data entry since it does not contemplate 
“real world mismatches and exception processing.”256 Further, 
DTCC suggests that a Blockchain based framework might lead 
to a system based on “regional rules” leading to a “partitioned 
scheme.”257 A Blockchain framework could however help to pre-
vent a large unknown trading loss, like JP Morgan Chase’s 2012 
“London Whale”258 through the programming of position limits.259 
In addition, “suspicious trading activity” could be identified early 
on a Blockchain to prevent regulatory penalties or financial losses.260 
E. Regulatory Considerations and Developments Relating to 
Blockchain Derivatives 
ISDA has identified regulatory benefits using Blockchain 
since “[t]ransaction data could be held on a permissioned, private 
distributed ledger that would be available to regulators. This would 
ensure there is a single, shared representation of each trade.”261 
Regulators would however need to adopt consistent stan-
dards for the industry.262 On November 30, 2017, at ISDA’s Tech-
nology and Standards: Unlocking Value in Derivatives Markets 
conference, CFTC Commissioner, Brian Quintenz articulated 
both the promise and the challenges (such as market participant 
adoption and overcoming implementation costs) in integrating 
Blockchain in derivatives markets.263 To support innovation, the 
CFTC recently launched Lab CFTC—designed to provide timely 
regulatory feedback to innovators, study, test and recommend new 
products and technologies, and coordinate oversight efforts with 
other domestic and international regulatory bodies.264 The CFTC 
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also recently signed a collaboration agreement with the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority to study financial technology.265 
There are lingering uncertainties including the effect of 
deregulation,266 the reporting and execution framework for cross 
border trades,267 regulatory arbitrage,268 and whether industry 
should own the Blockchain technology.269 Also the data made avail-
able to the regulators pursuant to the DFA requires technology 
to interpret and proactively monitor.270 
ISDA notes that an industry-wide Blockchain framework 
could remedy this problem, but regulators would need to improve 
assessment technologies.271 Also, regulators need “modified permis-
sions or an identification system to de-anonymize” the transaction 
parties.272 Another regulatory uncertainty noted by Ryan Surujnath 
is the effect of Blockchain on systemic risk,273 which could re-
duce the “risk of over-centralization.”274 
However, as Surujnath has argued, Blockchain derivatives 
could actually increase systemic risk relating to uncertainties in 
“settlement finality and recourse, especially in the context of 
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potential cyberattacks.”275 However, he notes that this concern 
may be alleviated through a private ledger.276 
F. Technological Barriers, Market Participant Adoption,  
Integration Failure Costs, and Data Privacy Concerns 
Despite the potential appeal of Blockchain, there are many 
technological barriers to be overcome before widespread integra-
tion can take place. ISDA has identified the need for a “consistent, 
non-ambiguous” coding language277 that is interoperable across 
industry lines and diverse use cases.278 Also, as noted by DTCC, 
there are “limits on the size of individual transactions and the 
number of transactions that can be written simultaneously,” as 
well as “latency between writes to the ledger and final confirma-
tion.”279 Further, DTCC posits that existing infrastructure might 
be improved without such high costs280 and the reality of hacks 
on a distributed leger (like in the case of the DAO) drives linger-
ing privacy and data protection concerns.281 
Also, as suggested by CFTC Commissioner Quintenz, par-
ticipants in the market must be willing to undertake the costs of 
digitization of their entire processing infrastructure.282 
This is a point that ISDA has identified and stressed in a 
September 2017 whitepaper entitled Data and Process Standards, 
“there is no commercial advantage to organi[z]ations developing 
and maintaining standards separately. Current mechanisms for 
information exchange and storage are not scalable and will poten-
tially (i) inhibit innovation and (ii) increase operational risks and 
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costs.”283 To this end, ISDA has recommended a “standardized 
data and process definition hierarchy”284 and has noted that, de-
spite the costs (and challenges), a Blockchain solution to deriva-
tives does present “long-term scalable foundations.”285 
DTCC has also identified several challenges to widespread 
industry integration of Blockchain including cost justifications, 
“inherent scale and performance challenges,” and industry and 
regulatory coordination and consensus.286 Further, the costs of 
error are high since the current system works.287 Additionally, 
ISDA notes there is a possibility that multiple ledgers could arise 
across markets and connecting these ledgers may prove difficult 
and costly.288 DTCC also notes uncertainty on Blockchain’s im-
munity from cyber-attacks289 and on the size and number of in-
dividual transactions that can be written simultaneously.290 
Another concern is data privacy, especially in light of different 
global regulatory standards.291 One could contemplate a “parti-
tioned ledger” solution, but this would need to be tested as viable.292 
CONCLUSION: CURRENT CDS AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES 
BLOCKCHAIN INITIATIVES 
In the spring of 2017, the first publicly announced Block-
chain derivatives initiative launched between DTCC, Blockchain 
developer Axoni, financial services software provider R3, and tech-
nology giant IBM.293 DTCC’s mission is to provide “post-trade 
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market infrastructure” to the U.S. financial industry294 and the 
joint venture project aims at creating a CDS clearing platform to 
enhance its operations.295 The joint venture’s first phase is to use 
Blockchain to improve DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse,296 
which is used in over 70 countries by more than 2500 firms to 
manage records for “$11 trillion of credit derivatives.”297 An ad-
ditional, more ambitious, subsequent phase would contemplate 
providing ledger connection points to participating firms, thereby 
“enabling them to validate reported data and directly access infor-
mation.”298 Project partners estimate that the joint venture will 
save between “20 to 30 percent” of the costs of running swaps 
conventionally,299 and preliminary trials show positive results.300 
Also, the initial assessments protected party confidentiality and 
showed regulatory promise as “regulators could view in ‘real time’ a 
wide range of financial events including trade details, counterparty 
risk metrics, and exposure to reference entities.”301 Critics, however, 
say that it is “still a proprietary system through which central-
ized players control trading behind walled-off networks.”302 
In additional to swaps, there are other Blockchain deriva-
tives projects currently contemplated. In February 2017, DTCC, 
along with Blockchain developer Digital Assets, announced the 
                                                                                                                        
294 See DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARING CORPORATION, http://www.dtcc 
.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/About/DTCC_Capabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/F826-P54J]. 
295 See Lielacher, supra note 293. 
296 See Trade Information Warehouse, DEPOSITORY TRUST CLEARING CORP., 
http://www.dtcc.com/derivatives-services/trade-information-warehouse, [https:// 
perma.cc/QG4T-X2UW]. 
297 Shin, supra note 191. 
298 Helen Bartholomew, Derivatives—DTCC on track for Q1 2018 blockchain 
CDS reporting, REUTERS (May 19, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/arti 
cle/derivatives-dtcc-on-track-for-q1-2018-bl/derivatives-dtcc-on-track-for-q1-2018 
-blockchain-cds-reporting-idUSL8N1IJ5BF [https://perma.cc/UU9L-5PX9]. 
299 Nordrum, supra note 32. 
300 See Anna Irrera, DTCC to rebuild credit default swaps processing platform 
with blockchain, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/arti 
cle/us-blockchain-dtcc-cds/dtcc-to-rebuild-credit-default-swaps-processing-platform 
-with-blockchain-idUSKBN14T1EA [https://perma.cc/C26B-GBXT]. 
301 Michael del Castillo, 7 Wall Street Firms Test Blockchain For Credit De-
fault Swaps, COINDESK (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain 
-credit-default-swaps-wall-street [https://perma.cc/X9CQ-SYJ9]. 
302 Nordrum, supra note 32. 
408 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 10:369 
desire to form a “Stakeholder Working Group” to study a Block-
chain application for the repo-netting process.303 Unfortunately 
this initiative was shelved in 2018 because “banks and other 
potential users believed the same results could be achieved more 
cheaply using current technology.”304 The repo-netting initiative 
would have allowed DTCC to “calculate a new net settlement 
amount at a point in time and record it in an immutable, secure 
and transparent distributed ledger.”305 DTCC is however work-
ing with Digital Asset Holdings on a Blockchain framework for 
syndicated loans,306 and also recently released a new study not-
ing that distributed ledger technology “is capable of supporting 
the average daily trading volumes in the U.S. equity market.”307 
In the United Kingdom, interdealer broker ICAP has also com-
pleted Blockchain trials for securities “post-trade processes,”308 
and private equity firm, Unigestion, recently adapted a “shadow 
mode” Blockchain private investment fund.309 Also, the Bank of 
Canada (Canada’s central bank) has partnered with TMX Group 
and Payments Canada to investigate the application of Blockchain 
to settlement and securities clearing,310 and recently announced 
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proof of concept for this project.311 Further, ING is working with 
ABN Amro and Societe Generale on a Blockchain project for agricul-
tural commodities;312 and Northern Trust has rolled out a Block-
chain-based framework for private equity deals based out of 
Guernsey, Channel Islands.313 
It would be disingenuous to state that Blockchain will not  
impact financial transactions in some way—even in mature 
markets—and this will likely include derivatives contracting 
and processing.314 The extent of its impact at this point is uncer-
tain. As with other nascent technologies, the “promise” (or hope) 
of an innovation’s potential impact can bring with it an unrealis-
tic optimism about how fast change will come about, the costs 
associated with creating this change, and the extent that we will 
end up in a better situation (all things considered) than we cur-
rently have.315 As the Article has shown, applying Blockchain to 
CDS, for both smart contract execution and post-trade processing 
infrastructure, has problems and drawbacks.316 At a minimum—
given our current level of technology—the implementation costs 
and questionable benefits should perhaps give us pause and cast 
a little doubt on just how quickly (and to what extent) Blockchain 
will actually change complex financial structures like derivatives 
transactions.317 As such, it would seem that the rush to herald 
Blockchain as inevitable for all commercial transactions is pre-
mature,318 and there is an emerging concern, identified recently 
by Penny Crosman of the American Banker, that enthusiasm for 
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new Blockchain projects across financial applications in America is 
“ebbing” by major institutions because of legal, regulatory and 
security concerns, high implementation costs, “interoperability 
issues”, and a lack of a clear “return on investment.”319 
This Article has analyzed a derivatives product (CDS) that 
seems, at the outset, to be ideal for Blockchain application, and 
then assessed, using the studies produced by ISDA, the DTCC, and 
other industry, technology, and legal commentaries and academic 
papers, whether there is a case to be made for using Blockchain 
to improve CDS execution and processing, while also facilitating 
enhanced regulatory supervision, and reducing transactional, 
operational and regulatory compliance costs.320 As noted, the 
results are largely mixed and also point to many drawbacks.321 
There are benefits worth exploring (which would explain the 
current projects discussed in this Part);322 however, there are 
also significant costs and barriers to implementation, with draw-
backs for smart contracts (which suggests a partial implementa-
tion is the only feasible application),323 and also concerns when 
Blockchain is used for CDS post-trade processing.324 
These drawbacks and concerns may explain why Block-
chain has not yet transformed the derivatives world, despite the 
technology being known for over a decade.325 Is it possible that, 
as technology writer Kai Stinchcombe has argued, “[t]he entire 
worldview underlying blockchain is wrong?”326 Time will ultimately 
judge this question, although a more reasonable short-term expla-
nation is simply that—like every other business decision—there 
are costs and benefits to be explored, and right now the costs seem 
to outweigh the benefits when using Blockchain for CDS. So what 
we are left with is a “wait and see” proposition, as to whether, and 
to what extent, technological improvements relating to Blockchain 
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will reduce or overcome altogether these costs, and also whether 
industry adoption will be homogenized enough to transcend the 
fragmentation concerns previously identified. If this occurs then 
we could see a larger CDS and derivatives market adoption of 
Blockchain technology; however, if technological progress is static, 
and adoption remains fragmented, then Blockchain implementa-
tion will be slow to materialize. 
 
